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UNITED STATES V BOOKER: THE DEMISE OF
MANDATORY FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND THE RETURN OF INDETERMINATE
SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, federal judges sentence thousands of criminal de-
fendants in federal district courts across the country.1 The United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commission" or
"Commission") promulgates the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"), which had required judges to sentence convicted
offenders according to factors set out by Congress and the Com-
mission.' Recently, cases have attacked the constitutionality of
the Guidelines' sentence enhancement provisions. These contro-
versies threaten over twenty years of sentencing reform and high-
light the issues Congress confronted when it created the Sentenc-
ing Commission in 1984.' Congress's primary intent in forming
the Commission was to create and implement a set of sentencing
guidelines that would greatly reduce judicial discretion.4 Without
a system of mandatory Guidelines, there is a genuine possibility
that sentencing will return to the indeterminate process Congress
sought to eliminate.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 the Supreme Court of the United
States provided the impetus for constitutional challenges to the
Guidelines in holding that facts increasing a criminal sentence
1. U.S. SENTENCII&G COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 3 tbl.1 [hereinafter 2002 STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.
ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/tablel.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
2. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2004) (held unconstitutional by United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)). Because this comment cites to amendments not
yet appearing in the print form of the United States Code, some citations reference the
United States Code Service.
3. See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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beyond the statutory maximum had to be pleaded to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment.6 The Supreme Court failed to consider, however, the consti-
tutionality of the Guidelines in Apprendi, effectively limiting the
scope of the Court's ruling. Nevertheless, in Blakely v. Washing-
ton,7 the Court made the prospect of a constitutional challenge to
the Guidelines imminent when it invalidated Washington's sen-
tencing procedure--a system that seemed indistinguishable from
the Guidelines.9 Finally, in United States v. Booker,1 ° the Su-
preme Court held that the Sixth Amendment invalidated these
sentence enhancement provisions and remedied the situation by
making the Guidelines advisory.1"
Part II of this note traces the historical development of the
Guidelines, including Congress's reasoning in creating the Sen-
tencing Commission and an explanation of how the Guidelines
function. Part III explains the Court's decisions in cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Guidelines before Booker. Part IV
discusses the background of Booker and examines the Court's ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V analyzes the im-
pact of Booker, including possible changes Congress will make to
the Guidelines and a proposal for congressional action from the
author.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. The Rise of the Rehabilitation Ideal
The Guidelines resulted from a series of contemporary criminal
reforms. The story of twentieth-century criminal reform in the
United States focuses on the rehabilitation viewpoint of punish-
ment. 2 This rehabilitation ideal derived from two beliefs: "first,
6. Id. at 490.
7. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
8. Id. at 2538.
9. Id. at 2548-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
11. Id. at 755-56, 767.
12. E.g., KATE STITH & JoSe A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 18 (1998).
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that inmates should be provided an incentive for betterment, and,
second, that experts-not judges-should determine when suffi-
cient improvement had taken place."13 In practice, this rehabilita-
tion ideal required that after conviction of a crime, punishment
was the result of both a system of indeterminate sentencing by
judges and a system of parole in which properly informed ex-
perts-rather than judges-ultimately decided when to release an
inmate. 4 On a federal level, rehabilitation became reality in 1910
when Congress created the possibility of parole for federal prison-
ers. 
15
The rehabilitation ideal was the dominant theory of criminal
punishment through the 1960s.' One of the distinguishing fea-
tures of this concept was bifurcated trial proceedings,17 which the
Court seemed to support."8 In Williams v. New York, 9 the Court
upheld the distinction between adjudication and sentencing, and
the different constitutional requirements of each proceeding.2 ° In
Williams, Justice Black wrote,
[T]he due process clause does provide these salutary and time-tested
protections where the question for consideration is the guilt of a de-
fendant... [a] sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the nar-
row issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the is-
sue of guilt has been determined.
2 1
13. Id. at 17.
14. See id. at 17-18.
15. PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. PAROLE COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE
SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/uspc/history.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2005). The federal parole system failed to limit federal judicial control of sentencing,
unlike similar enactments in the states. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 18-19. In-
stead, the status quo for federal sentencing remained, in which Congress prescribed
maximum penalties and fines and required federal judges to impose determinate sen-
tences for each crime. Id. Although parole officials technically determined the actual
length of imprisonment for a convict, federal criminal law required defendants to serve at
least one-third of their sentence-in effect, judges retained much discretion over how
much time a particular inmate spent in prison. Id.
16. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895 (1990).
17. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 28.
18. Id. at 28. Traditionally, the trial phase of a criminal proceeding was separate from
the sentencing phase. This intentional split divided a prosecution into a jury trial to de-
termine whether the defendant committed the crime, and a later sentencing proceeding to
analyze the relevant factors in calculating a "just punishment." Id. at 22.
19. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
20. Id. at 251-52.
21. Id. at 245, 247.
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In practice, this decision affirmed the notion that judges were
not limited procedurally at the sentencing stage by the same con-
stitutional requirements imposed at trial.22 The Court later af-
firmed this distinction in United States v. Grayson.23 In Grayson,
the defendant claimed that the trial court infringed on his consti-
tutional right to due process when the sentencing judge increased
the sentence for escape from prison upon a finding, independent
of the jury, that the defendant perjured himself.24 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger declared that '[blefore
making [the sentencing] determination, a judge may appropri-
ately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come."'25
B. The Fall of the Rehabilitation Ideal
The rehabilitation ideal relied upon indeterminate sentenc-
ing-judges had wide discretion to sentence defendants based on
character and other factors.26 In theory, the use of parole in this
system served as a check and balance on these judges, allowing
parole officials to correct excessive sentences. 27 By the 1970s,
however, empirical research began to cast doubt on the efficacy of
the indeterminate sentencing regime. 2' These studies claimed
that unfounded disparities existed on both federal and state lev-
els in the sentencing and parole systems.2 9 The most influential
critic of indeterminate sentencing was Judge Marvin E.
Frankel.3 ° In 1973, Judge Frankel published Criminal Sentences:
22. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 28. Similarly, the Court has held that parole
officers have wide discretion in obtaining and using information to determine whether to
release an inmate. Id. at 29.
23. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
24. Id. at 42-45.
25. Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (alterations in
original)).
26. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 29-30.
27. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 3-49
(1973).
28. See Nagel, supra note 16, at 895-96.
29. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 31.
30. See Nagel, supra note 16, at 896; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1942 (1988).
Judge Frankel served as a district court judge in United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Id.
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Law Without Order, a book containing severe criticism of inde-
terminate sentencing and the wide discretion it conferred on
judges.31 Judge Frankel proposed the creation of a sentencing
commission, which would establish sentencing guidelines to re-
place the use of judicial and parole official discretion in deciding
the length and type of punishment for a crime.32
C. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The studies challenging the usefulness of indeterminate sen-
tencing eventually caught the attention of Senator Edward Ken-
nedy. In 1975, Senator Kennedy introduced the first bill propos-
ing the creation of a United States Sentencing Commission.33 The
political climate in the 1970s and the 1980s-namely, the persist-
ing affinity for the rehabilitation ideal-prevented the bill's im-
mediate passage4.3  As the national crime rate increased during
the 1980s, however, so did the fear that discretionary judicial
sentencing and the use of parole would result in sentences that
were either too short, or even worse, prisoners serving less time
than appropriate because of good fortune in the parole process.35
Proponents of sentencing reform capitalized on these fears and
introduced comprehensive anticrime legislation that included ma-
jor changes to sentencing.36 President Reagan signed the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act into law on October 12, 1984.37 A
component of this anticrime law, termed the Sentencing Reform
31. See FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 3-49.
The sentencing powers of the judges are, in short, so far unconfmed that, ex-
cept for frequently monstrous maximum limits, they are effectively subject to
no law at all. Everyone with the least training in law would be prompt to de-
nounce a statute that merely said the penalty for crimes "shall be any term
the judge sees fit to impose." . . . But the fact is that we have accepted un-
thinkingly a criminal code creating in effect precisely that degree of unbridled
power.
Id. at S.
32. Id. at 118-24.
33. PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 4 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN-YEAR
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/15-year/15year.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
34. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 39-48.
35. See id. at 43-48.
36. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
37. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1984) (repealed 1987)).
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Act, created the United States Sentencing Commission as an in-
dependent agency within the judicial branch."
Congress had three distinct goals in mind when it enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act: (1) reducing unwarranted disparity; (2)
assuring certainty and severity of punishment; and (3) increasing
rationality and transparency of punishment.39 These goals re-
flected a response to the criticism of indeterminate sentencing
that arose in the 1970s." The Sentencing Reform Act's purposes
for establishing a sentencing commission also suggest a similar
response. These purposes, listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, essentially
direct the Commission to create sentencing guidelines that are
proportional to the seriousness of the crime committed, increase
public safety via crime control, and provide for rehabilitation. 1
Working with these goals and purposes in mind, the Sentenc-
ing Commission deliberated for eighteen months before deciding
how best to fashion a comprehensive set of sentencing guide-
lines." The Commission hoped to design a sentencing procedure
addressing the concerns that indeterminate sentencing produced
gross disparities and unjust sentences. First, the Commission
simplified the sentencing process by grouping similar crimes into
general classes of offenses. 4 By doing so, the Commission hoped
to develop a system ensuring that defendants committing similar
38. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000)).
39. FIyrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-12.
40. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2000). Section 3553(a)(2) lists the purposes of sen-
tencing as:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.]
Id.
42. FiFrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 14.
43. See id. at 15. For a discussion of the concerns regarding indeterminate sentencing,
see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. One important way in which the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act restricts variation in sentences among like crimes is by requiring that the
Commission create sentencing ranges in which the maximum sentence for a crime exceeds
the minimum by no more than twenty-five percent, provided the range between the mini-
mum and maximum is at least six months. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000).
44. Ilene Nagel, Writing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in PETER H. ROSSI &
RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS
COMPARED 25 (1997).
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crimes would receive similar sentences. 5 Next, the Sentencing
Commission analyzed over 10,000 sentencing reports and 100,000
federal convictions. 6 From these data, the Commission calculated
the average time served for each class of crime.47 These figures
set the offense level for each crime-the possible baseline sen-
tencing range. The Commission also identified factors associated
with each crime, which would either increase or decrease a given
sentence.49 The Sentencing Commission integrated a defendant's
criminal history into the sentencing calculus.5 ° Finally, the Com-
mission devised the Sentencing Table, which included forty-three
offense levels and six classes of criminal history.5 After congres-
sional review, the Commission introduced the first set of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines on November 1, 1987.52
D. Understanding How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work
Before discussing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
Guidelines, it is important to examine how the Guidelines func-
tion. For the purposes of this discussion, assume that a jury has
convicted a criminal defendant, with no prior criminal history, of
planning a complex burglary and successfully stealing $500,000
from a home while in the possession of a firearm. Remember that
the sentencing stage arrives only after the jury has completed all
fact-finding and returned a conviction for the criminal defen-
dant.53 By this time, the judge has usually received the presen-
tence report-a document containing facts gathered by a United
45. Id.
46. FIFrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 14.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. These mitigating and aggravating factors are known as "specific offense char-
acteristics." Id.
50. Id. at 15.
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2004) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES]. The Sentencing Table functioned as a matrix, with corresponding offense
levels, specific offense characteristics, and criminal history leading the judge to one spe-
cific sentence for each crime. See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
52. GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 1A1.1, cmt. background (2004). The Sentencing
Commission must submit the Guidelines and any amendments to Congress for approval.
28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000).
53. See GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 1A1.1, cmt. background (2004).
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States probation officer.54 The presentence report contains a wide
variety of facts, which may or may not have been pleaded and
proved to a jury. Moreover, the judge may accept "any undis-
puted portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact."56
First, the judge determines the base offense level by identifying
the relevant crime in chapter two of the Guidelines. Here, our de-
fendant is guilty of burglary of a residence, which carries an of-
fense level of seventeen.57 Next, the judge looks at the specific of-
fense characteristics associated with each crime to determine
whether any of the circumstances of the commission of a crime
justify increasing the offense level. The court may consider "all
relevant conduct" to determine the base offense level and specific
offense characteristics." In our hypothetical, the judge increases
the offense level by a value of eight because the burglary required
more than "minimal planning" (plus two),59 the defendant stole
more than $250,000 (plus four),6  and the defendant carried a
firearm (plus two).61 Thus, the offense level for our defendant is
twenty-five. The judge then considers whether any adjustments
would apply. These adjustments, located in chapter three of the
Guidelines, apply broadly to many crimes and include: (1) in-
creases and decreases in a sentence for factors such as the state
of the victim; (2) the defendant's role in the offense; (3) whether
the defendant obstructed law enforcement; (4) whether the defen-
dant is convicted of multiple charges; and (5) whether the defen-
dant accepted responsibility for the crime.62 None of these ad-
justments apply to our hypothetical defendant.
Next, the judge examines the criminal history of the offender.
The Guidelines assign points representing the criminal history of
a convicted offender.63 This value translates into a Criminal His-
tory Category between I and VI. Because our defendant has no
prior convictions, he receives a criminal history score of zero,
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d), (g).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)(A)-(3)(C).
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A).
57. GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2B2.1(a)(1) (2004).
58. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2B2.1(b)(1) (2004).
60. Id. § 2B2.1(b)(2)(E).
61. Id. § 2B2.1(b)(4).
62. Id. §§ 3A1.1-3E1.1.
63. Id. §§ 4Al.1-4B1.5.
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placing him in Criminal History Category I.64 After determining
the proper offense level and Criminal History Category, a judge
looks to the Sentencing Table to identify the applicable sentenc-
ing range. The Sentencing Table is divided into four zones labeled
alphabetically A through D, with Zone A representing the mildest
sentences and Zone D representing the harshest." With an of-
fense level of twenty-five and a Criminal History Category I, our
defendant falls into Zone D on the Sentencing Table.66 The judge
must sentence him to a term of imprisonment between fifty-seven
and seventy-one months.67
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Providing the Guidelines with Constitutional Armor: Mistretta
v. United States
Soon after the Sentencing Commission introduced the Guide-
lines, numerous federal district courts invalidated them as un-
constitutional." It is possible that factors other than defense of
the Constitution motivated federal judges to invalidate the
Guidelines, because a key development leading to the creation of
the Sentencing Commission was a growing distrust of judicial
discretion.69 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and
the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United States.7" In doing so, the
Court rejected arguments that Congress violated the nondelega-
64. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
65. Id. It is particularly important for the criminal defendant to avoid Zone D, if pos-
sible. While a judge may give an offender falling into Zones A-C an alternative sentence to
imprisonment within an applicable sentencing range, those convicted and sentenced in
Zone D must serve at least the minimum sentence in a given sentencing range. See id. §§
5B1.1-5D1.3.
66. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
67. Id. Thus, our hypothetical defendant will serve a prison term of no less than fifty-
seven months.
68. MICHAEL H. TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 73 (1996).
69. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12, at 39 ("Liberals and conservatives alike evinced a deep suspicion of discretionary
judgment by federal judges; Congress was determined to limit it by delegating sentencing
authority to an administrative agency that promised to be more responsive to Congress
itself.").
70. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
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* tion doctrine by granting the Sentencing Commission excessive
legislative authority71 and the separation of powers doctrine by
placing the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch.72
Since Mistretta, federal judges have sentenced more than
650,000 criminal defendants using the Guidelines.73 Despite the
acquiescence by federal judges to the Guidelines, there is evi-
dence that federal judges administered the Guidelines out of judi-
cial duty rather than any belief in their usefulness."4 In 1990, the
Judicial Conference of the United States published a report indi-
cating "'pervasive concern [among federal judges] that the Com-
mission's guidelines [were] producing fundamental and deleteri-
ous changes in the way federal courts process criminal cases.' 75
The principal worry of these judges and other commentators was
that the Guidelines did not allow sufficient judicial discretion.76
Despite the concern over judicial discretion, Mistretta provided
the Guidelines with the constitutional armor necessary to func-
tion. In 2000, however, the Court decided the first in a new line of
cases that would again challenge the constitutionality of the
Guidelines .
B. The First Chink in the Guidelines' Constitutional Armor:
Apprendi v. New Jersey
1. The Facts of Apprendi
In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, someone shot
several bullets into the home of the first African-American family
to reside in a previously all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New
Jersey.7" Shortly after the shooting, police arrested Charles C.
Apprendi, Jr., who confessed to the shooting about an hour
71. Id. at 371-79.
72. Id. at 380-411.
73. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 2, available at http://www.ussc.
gov/ANNRPT/2002/chl-2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
74. See TONRY, supra note 68, at 74-76.
75. Id. at 75 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrTEE 135 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE]).
76. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 75, at 135.
77. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
78. Id. at 469.
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later.79 About three hours after his admission, Apprendi re-
sponded to further questioning by stating that he did not want
people in the neighborhood who were "'black in color."'' 0
Two New Jersey statutes were relevant in Apprendi. The first
defined possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose as a sec-
ond-degree offense, which imposed a sentencing range between
five and ten years. 1 The second, known as New Jersey's hate
crime law, allowed an extended term of imprisonment between
ten and twenty years for second-degree offenses when committed
with a biased purpose such as race. 2 In finding a biased purpose,
the trial judge is required to use a standard of preponderance of
the evidence. 3
Apprendi entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to two
second-degree counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose.8 4 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge
concluded that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that
Apprendi's purpose was racial intimidation, and as such, justified
the enhanced sentencing provided for by New Jersey's hate crime
law. 5 The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years impris-
onment on the count relating to the December 22 shooting and a
shorter concurrent term on the other second-degree offense. 6 Ap-
prendi appealed the enhanced sentence, arguing that the "Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that
the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."" Both the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey and the
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed. 8 Following the Supreme
Court of New Jersey's decision, Apprendi appealed to the Su-
preme Court of the United States.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (1999)).
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 468-69.
84. Id. at 469-70. As part of Apprendi's plea agreement, he also pleaded guilty to a
lesser third-degree count. The sentence for this count, however, is immaterial to the hold-
ing in Apprendi, because it did not affect the maximum sentencing range that the trial
court could impose. See id. at 470. Thus, the maximum sentence before any enhancement
the trial judge could impose on Apprendi was twenty years, ten for each second-degree of-
fense. Id.
85. Id. at 470-71.
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 471-72.
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2. The Holding of Apprendi
In a five-to-four decision, 9 the Court agreed with Apprendi's
claim that New Jersey's hate crime law violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute au-
thorized an increase beyond the maximum sentence for a crime
based on a factual determination made by a judge rather than a
jury.9" To support this holding, Justice John Paul Stevens exam-
ined the Court's Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and
the development of the rights granted therein, concluding that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."91 Recognizing the long-standing tradition of judicial dis-
cretion at sentencing in the United States,92 Justice Stevens
noted that the Court's decision did not invalidate a judge's right
to consider various facts in determining a sentence if "that discre-
tion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by
the legislature."93
3. The Effect of Apprendi
The dissenters in Apprendi feared that the majority's holding
would undo the Guidelines and "unleash a flood of petitions by
convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in
whole or in part."94 This was a reasonable concern because Ap-
prendi's holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submit-
89. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 468.
90. Id. at 476.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id. at 481; see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("[Bloth before and
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England prac-
ticed a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law."); see also supra notes 16-25 and
accompanying text (discussing the traditional division between trial and sentencing).
93. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
94. Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see id. at 543-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the likely deleterious effect of Apprendi on federal and state sentencing guide-
lines).
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ted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"9" seemed to
apply broadly to all sentencing regimes.96 Moreover, the Court
failed to give lower federal courts any guidance on the issue, pre-
ferring to answer that question another day.97
The aftermath of Apprendi was not invalidation of the Guide-
lines as the dissenters predicted. On June 24, 2002, the Supreme
Court applied Apprendi to two separate cases, Ring v. Arizona"
and Harris v. United States,99 without ruling on the constitution-
ality of the Guidelines or invoking the concerns of the Apprendi
dissenters. Following suit, lower federal courts applied Apprendi
without any determination as to the constitutionality of the
Guidelines. °° In fact, no federal court ever ruled that the Guide-
lines were unconstitutional based solely on Apprendi.'°' Although
this outcome should have allayed their fears, the Court's applica-
tion of Apprendi in Blakely v. Washington worried the dissenters
every bit as much, if not more, over the future of the Guide-
lines.102
C. The Chink Becomes a Gaping Hole: Blakely v. Washington
1. The Facts of Blakely
In 1998, Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. used a knife to kidnap his
ex-wife from her home, bind her with tape, and force her into a
95. Id. at 490.
96. Id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 497 n.21 ("The Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore
express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held.").
98. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that Apprendi applies when a judge, without a
jury, finds aggravating facts required to impose the death penalty).
99. 536 U.S. 545, 568-69 (2002) (holding that Apprendi does not apply when consider-
ing increases in mandatory minimums).
100. See, e.g., Akosa v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding, without invalidating the Guidelines, that Apprendi did not apply to an inmate's
sentence for drug-related offenses); United States v. Walls, 215 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (D.
D.C. 2002) (holding, without invalidating the Guidelines, that Apprendi does not apply
retroactively to an initial motion to vacate); United States v. Enigwe, 212 F. Supp. 2d 420,
430-31 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding, without invalidating the Guidelines, that Apprendi does
not apply to cases on collateral review).
101. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2547 n.1 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that as recently as June 24, 2004, the only court to ever invalidate a system of
sentencing guidelines using Apprendi was the Kansas Supreme Court in 2001).
102. See id. at 2543-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2551-62 (Breyer, J., dissent-
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box in the bed of his truck.103 Forcing their thirteen-year-old son
to follow in another car, Blakely drove from Washington state to
Montana. °4 The son escaped when both vehicles stopped for gas,
and police eventually arrested Blakely in Montana.'
The state of Washington utilized sentencing guidelines to de-
termine the possible term of imprisonment for convicted offend-
ers.106 Three provisions of Washington's sentencing guidelines
were relevant in Blakely. First, Washington's guidelines provided
a ten-year maximum for class B felonies such as second-degree
kidnapping. 107 Second, the sentencing guidelines required a span
of forty-nine to fifty-three months as the standard range for sec-
ond-degree kidnapping with a firearm.' Third, the guidelines al-
lowed a judge to impose an exceptional sentence if he concluded
there were "'substantial and compelling reasons justifying an ex-
ceptional sentence.""0 9 Such a conclusion must "take[ ] into ac-
count factors other than those which are used in computing the
standard range sentence for the offense.""0 Imposition of an ex-
ceptional sentence required the judge to set forth findings of fact
and conclusions of law in support."'
Blakely entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to
second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of
a firearm." 2 Although the State recommended a sentence within
the standard range, the judge instead imposed an exceptional
sentence of ninety months." 3 The judge defended his decision on
a finding that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty, a recognized
basis for departure from the standard range in domestic violence
cases." 4 Blakely appealed his sentence, arguing that Washing-
103. Id. at 2534.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 2535.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.120(2) (2000) (recodified at § 9.94A.505
(2001)).
110. Id. (quoting State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (Wash. 2001)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Note that the exceptional sentence of ninety months was still less than the ten-
year maximum allowed for class B felonies.
114. Id. After an initial determination of deliberate cruelty, Blakely objected. The judge
then conducted a bench hearing over three days from which he issued thirty-two findings
of fact. These findings led to the same conclusion of deliberate cruelty. Id. at 2535-36.
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ton's sentencing guidelines violated his constitutional right "to
have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally
essential to his sentence."115 The State Court of Appeals affirmed
and the Supreme Court of the State of Washington denied
Blakely's petition for review.1 '6 Blakely appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
2. The Holding of Blakely
Writing for the majority in a five-to-four decision, Justice An-
tonin Scalia invalidated the Washington statute allowing a judge
to impose an exceptional sentence if the court found additional
compelling facts not considered by a jury."7 Applying Apprendi,
the Court found it immaterial that Blakely's exceptional sentence
of ninety months still fell within the statutory maximum of ten
years set for class B felonies." ' Justice Scalia explained "that the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sen-
tence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."'19 The Court
concluded that the Washington statute violated the Sixth Amend-
ment by requiring a judge to rely on judicial fact-finding to justify
an exceptional sentence.'2 °
3. The Effect of Blakely
Immediately after the Court's ruling in Blakely, the doomsday
scenario for the Guidelines that the Apprendi dissenters pre-
dicted seemed once again possible.' 2 ' Although the Court again
115. Id. at 2536.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2538. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington only allowed an excep-
tional sentence beyond the standard range if a judge considered "factors other than those
which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the offense.'" Id. at 2537
(quoting State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (Wash. 2001)). Justice Scalia was joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 2533.
118. See id. at 2537.
119. Id. at 2537 ("In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maxi-
mum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings.").
120. Id. at 2538.
121. Id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision casts constitutional doubt
over [the sentencing guidelines of states and the federal government] and, in so doing,
threatens an untold number of criminal judgments.").
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refused to comment in Blakely as to the constitutionality of the
Guidelines,'22 the dissenters noted that the sentencing regime in
Washington was indistinguishable in practice from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 23 Moreover, the fact that an administra-
tive agency promulgated the Guidelines instead of a legislative
body, as was the case in Blakely, was immaterial to the dissent
because "[tihe Guidelines have the force of law ... and Congress
has unfettered control to reject or accept any particular guide-
line." 24 The dissenters claimed that Blakely would have a disas-
trous effect on past, pending, and future criminal judgments. 125
The immediate aftermath of Blakely was not quite the disaster
the dissenters forecasted. While many federal courts did invali-
date the Guidelines, 26 the principal consequence of Blakely was
great anxiety and confusion as courts, 127 the Department of Jus-
tice, 12 and Congress 29 attempted to grapple with the majority's
122. Id. at 2538 n.9 ("The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opin-
ion on them."); id. at 2540 ("This case is not about whether determinate sentencing is con-
stitutional, only about how it can be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amend-
ment.").
123. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissenters opined that the
structure of the Guidelines made them more susceptible to invalidation under Blakely-
upon the finding of additional facts by the judge, the Washington statute merely allows
upward departures while the Federal Guidelines require them. Id. at 2550.
124. Id. at 2549 (citations omitted).
125. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. See United States v. Agett, 327 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906-07 (E.D. Tenn. 2004); United
States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D. Mass. 2004); United States v. Sisson, 326
F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D. Mass. 2004); United States v. Marrero, 325 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
127. The federal courts responded with various approaches to Blakely including declar-
ing the Guidelines unconstitutional, using them in an advisory fashion, only applying
some sentence enhancements, and holding the Guidelines unaffected. See OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL, FREQUENCY REPORT 1-5 (2004) [hereinafter FREQUENCY REPORT],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/11-30-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
128. On July 2, 2004, Deputy Attorney General James Comey issued a memorandum to
all federal prosecutors stating that the official position of the federal government was that
Blakely did not apply to the Guidelines. The memorandum outlined the government's ar-
gument and detailed charging, plea, and trial procedures to follow until the Supreme
Court decided whether Blakely invalidated the Guidelines. See Memorandum from James
Comey, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors (July 2, 2004), available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/dag-blakely-memo-7204.p
df (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
129. On July 13, 2004, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted hearings regarding
the impact of Blakely on the Guidelines and the steps Congress should take in response.
See Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Blakely Hear-
ings] (testimony of Sen. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary), at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member-statement.cfm?id=1260&witid=51 (last visited Apr. 2,
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rule. Why did Blakely fail to destroy the Guidelines? One possible
reason is that so long as the Supreme Court expressed no opinion
on the matter, there was no requirement that the lower federal
courts deviate from the Guidelines. 130 Everything changed, how-
ever, when the Court reached its decision in United States v.
Booker, which left the Guidelines defenseless against Sixth
Amendment challenges.
IV. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
A. The Facts of Booker
In Booker, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases to ad-
dress whether Blakely applied to the Guidelines. 131 In the case of
Freddie Booker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit invalidated the lower court's decision to impose an
enhanced sentence, because the district court judge determined
that Booker possessed 566 grams of crack cocaine subsequent to a
jury determination that Booker had only possessed 92.5 grams. 32
Holding that Blakely applied, the Seventh Circuit observed that
"[tihe vices of the guidelines are thus that they require the sen-
tencing judge to make findings of fact [instead of the jury when
sentencing] .""' Similarly, the United States District Court for the
District of Maine also refused to apply an enhanced sentence to
Duncan Fanfan, despite the trial judge's belief that Fanfan was
"the ring leader of a significant drug conspiracy,"'34 because doing
so would require judicial fact-finding.3 5 In reaching this conclu-
2005).
130. In fact, one might make the argument that the lower federal courts could not in-
validate the Guidelines based on Blakely. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 516 (7th
Cir. 2004), (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court is the only court
that may ultimately say whether the Guidelines are unconstitutional), affd, 125 S. Ct. 738
(2005).
131. 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
132. Booker, 375 F.3d at 509.
133. Id. at 511.
134. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 106, United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL
1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004) (No. 03-47-P-H), available at http://www.med.uscourts.
gov/Opinions/Hornby/2004IDBH_06282004_2-03cr47 U_S V FANFAN.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
135. Id. at 104-05.
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sion, the district court ruled that the Guidelines were indistin-
guishable from those at issue in Blakely.'36
In its petitions for writs of certiorari regarding Booker and
Fanfan, the federal government asked the Supreme Court to de-
termine whether its decisions in Apprendi and Blakely applied to
the Guidelines.'37 The Court considered two questions:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an
enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a
prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant.
2. If. . . "yes" . . . . [W]hether, in a case in which the Guidelines
would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sen-
tencing Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of
severability analysis, such that the sentencing court must exercise
its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and
minimum set by statute for the offense of conviction. 138
The Court's resolution of these issues resulted in the uncom-
mon result of a split majority opinion. In a five-to-four decision, 139
Justice Stevens concluded that the enhancement factors required
by the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. 40 In a separate
five-to-four ruling,' Justice Stephen G. Breyer held that, al-
though the sentence-enhancing aspects of the Guidelines violated
the Sixth Amendment, the statutory provisions making the en-
hancements mandatory could be excised and severed-resulting
in a system of Guidelines that are merely advisory. 42
136. See id. at 104 ("[P]erhaps the Supreme Court can find a way to explain away
Blakely in its language and its reasoning, but as a trial Judge and a sentencing Judge, I
cannot. I must take it as it is written. I will leave it to higher courts to tell me it does not
mean exactly what it says.").
137. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
138. Id. at 747 n.1.
139. Id. at 746.
140. Id. at 756.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 756-57.
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B. The Sentence-Enhancing Provisions of the Guidelines Violate
the Sixth Amendment
1. Justice Stevens: Majority Opinion Part I
a. Blakely Applies to the Guidelines
Considering its earlier rulings regarding sentencing and the
Sixth Amendment,"' it was inevitable that the Court would ex-
tend Blakely to the Guidelines. In fact, Justice Stevens employed
the same argument in Booker that the Court employed earlier in
Apprendi and Blakely-namely, that the Constitution has long
required that a jury find all facts necessary to charge a criminal
defendant with a crime.' As such, "[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."4 ' Justice Stevens
acknowledged that the current Guidelines, if overlaid with this
jury trial requirement, would be constitutional because the Court
has "never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad dis-
cretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range."'46 The
Guidelines, however, are mandatory,'47 and the use of sentence-
enhancing facts shift the power to determine the upper bounds of
sentencing from the jury to the judge, without the same standard
of reasonable doubt afforded at trial. 4 ' After determining that
143. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) ("IT]he relevant 'statutory
maximum'is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts,
but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts
punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the
facts 'which the law makes essential to the punishment.'") (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55 (2d ed. 1872)); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); supra notes 89-93, 117-20
and accompanying text.
144. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536-37; Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 476-85.
145. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
146. Id. at 750.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 751-52. Moreover, as sentence-enhancing facts began to carry higher
penalties, the jury's determination of the underlying crime became secondary. Id. (citing
instances where sentence enhancements significantly increase the possible sentence for a
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Blakely applied to the Guidelines, Justice Stevens examined and
dismissed three arguments that the federal government offered in
support of its contention that Blakely did not apply to the Guide-
lines.
b. The Federal Government's Arguments Are Unpersuasive
First, the government maintained that Blakely did not apply to
the Guidelines because they were promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission rather than by Congress. 4 9 The government argued
that the Court's holding in Apprendi only considered "'any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum."'"5 Although the holding in Apprendi suggested
applicability only to statutory maximums and not sentencing
guidelines, Justice Stevens dismissed this notion because the
Court was only considering a New Jersey statute and not the
Guidelines at the time.' 5 ' Effectively, the constitutional right to a
jury trial could not be limited, "[r]egardless of whether the legal
basis of the accusation is in a statute or in [the Gluidelines."152
Second, the government cited four cases that prevented the
Court from applying Blakely to the Guidelines. 5 ' The Court ex-
amined these decisions and decided that all four were inconsis-
tent with Blakely.'54 Justice Stevens found no need to overrule
United States v. Dunnigan'55 because circumstances exist where
federal judges might apply sentence enhancements for perjury
without exceeding the maximum sentence for an offense. 15 6 The
Court held that Witte v. United States 57 and United States v.
convicted offender).
149. Brief for United States at 19, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Nos.
04-104 & 04-105) [hereinafter U.S. Brief].
150. Id. at 15 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis
added)).
151. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752-53.
152. Id. at 753.
153. U.S. Brief, supra note 149, at 32-38.
154. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753-54.
155. 507 U.S. 87 (1993). In Dunnigan, the Court held that the Guidelines' requirement
that judges apply a sentence enhancement, upon a judicial finding that the accused com-
mitted perjury at trial, does not violate the privilege to testify on one's own behalf. Id. at
98.
156. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753.
157. 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
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Watts, 158 cases examining the interaction of the Double Jeopardy
Clause with the Guidelines,'59 did not apply because the Court in
those cases did not consider the Sixth Amendment issue. 160 Fi-
nally, Justice Stevens found no precedent in Edwards v. United
States'16 that would limit the Court's holding in Blakely.'62
Third, the government claimed that the requirement that sen-
tencing factors be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
would violate the doctrine of separation of powers, because such a
requirement vests in the Sentencing Commission the legislative
power to define elements of crimes-a province usually reserved
for Congress. 63 Justice Stevens rejected this premise, stating that
nothing in the Court's decision conflicted with its earlier holding
in Mistretta v. United States" that upheld Congress's delegation
of authority to the Sentencing Commission.1 65 Rather, the Court
has always "recognized the fact that the Commission is an inde-
pendent agency that exercises policy-making authority delegated
to it by Congress."166
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
a. Sixth Amendment Rights Are Not Implicated at Sentencing
The dissenters from Apprendi and Blakely banded together one
more time to rebut the contention that the Sixth Amendment pro-
hibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences via judicial fact-
finding.'67 First, Justice Breyer analyzed the history of sentencing
practices and rejected any notion that sentencing traditionally af-
forded criminal defendants the right to a jury trial.16 Instead, the
law recognized a difference between "facts [as] elements of crimes
158. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
159. Watts, 519 U.S. at 157; Witte, 515 U.S. at 406.
160. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753-54.
161. 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
162. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 754.
163. U.S. Brief, supra note 149, at 63-66.
164. 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
165. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 754-55.
166. Id. at 755.
167. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion in response to Majority Opinion Part I. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
168. Id. at 803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and facts that are relevant only to sentencing."169 The Guidelines
only concern sentencing facts, and as such, judges use them "not
to convict a person of a crime as a statute defines it, but to help
determine an appropriate punishment."7 ' Moreover, Justice
Breyer explained that federal law has upheld judicial fact-finding
during sentencing so long as the convicted defendant had both an
opportunity to contest those facts before the judge and the sen-
tence fell within a range specified by Congress.17" '
Next, Justice Breyer examined the constitutional implications
of applying Blakely to the Guidelines. Justice Breyer criticized
the Majority Opinion Part I Justices for removing from Congress
the power to specify criminal sentences.'72 In the federal govern-
ment, Congress alone has the right to decide the sentencing range
of offenses and to differentiate facts as either elements of crimes
or sentencing factors. 7 3 Thus, Justice Breyer opined that the im-
position of the Sixth Amendment on the Guidelines unduly limits
Congress's powers.174
b. The Guidelines Are Distinguishable from Those at Issue in
Apprendi and Blakely
Justice Breyer also argued that even if the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right applied to the sentencing schemes at issue in Ap-
prendi and Blakely, the Court should not extend its holdings in
those cases to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.17' First, Justice
Breyer emphasized that Apprendi and Blakely applied to statu-
tory mandates while the Guidelines are merely administrative
rules.'76 As such, the dissent noted that any fear of the Sentenc-
ing Commission taking the place of Congress in legislating par-
ticular elements for crimes was unfounded, "because it cannot
write substantive criminal statutes at all."'77
169. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The upshot is that the Court's Sixth Amendment
decisions-Apprendi, Blakely, and today's-deprive Congress and state legislatures of au-
thority that is constitutionally theirs.").
173. Id. at 805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Next, the dissent distinguished the sentencing statutes in
Blakely from the Guidelines by examining their control of judges.
The Washington statutes in Blakely allowed an enhanced sen-
tence only if the judge determined the existence of a fact separate
from those elements comprising a crime. 7 ' The Guidelines' provi-
sion for departures, however, provides no similar limitation on
federal judges.179 Justice Breyer noted that the practical effect of
this difference is that federal judges may sentence a criminal de-
fendant "anywhere within the range provided by statute-
regardless of the applicable Guidelines range."18° Thus, Justice
Breyer argued that Blakely does not apply because the statutory
maximum for a particular offense is actually the maximum set by
Congress-a ceiling federal judges cannot exceed-and not the
upper bound of the sentencing range established by the Sentenc-
ing Commission. 81
C. Excision and Severability of the Sentence-Enhancing
Provisions of the Guidelines
1. Justice Breyer: Majority Opinion Part II
a. The Guidelines Are Incompatible with the Constitutional Jury
Trial Requirement
After Justice Stevens held that Blakely applied to the Guide-
lines, the question remained whether the sentence-enhancing
provisions of the Guidelines invalidated the entire Guidelines sys-
tem. 1 82 To answer this question, Justice Breyer considered
whether the Guidelines could incorporate the jury trial require-
ment imposed by the Majority Opinion Part I Justices. 83 The
Court concluded that the jury trial requirement was not compati-
ble with congressional intent in creating the Guidelines for five
reasons: (1) Congress intended that judges and not juries decide
178. Id. at 807 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 756.
183. See id. at 757.
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what sentence to impose; 1 4 (2) the jury trial requirement pre-
vents sentencing uniformity, the basic goal of Congress in passing
the Sentencing Reform Act;' (3) the requirement creates a sen-
tencing system considerably more complex than Congress in-
tended;"8 6 (4) plea bargaining under the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement would diminish Congress's purpose of uniform
sentencing;8 7 and (5) Congress would not allow a sentencing re-
gime that makes upward departures harder to impose than
downward ones.' In light of these findings, Justice Breyer
claimed that Congress would have preferred invalidation of the
Guidelines to a system integrating the jury trial requirement.8 9
b. Sections 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) of the Sentencing Reform Act
Must Be Excised
After concluding that Congress would not have incorporated
the jury trial requirement into the current Guidelines, the Court
still needed to fashion a remedy to fix the current sentencing re-
gime. 90 The Court examined the feasibility of severing and excis-
ing the unconstitutional portions of the Sentencing Reform Act
184. Id. at 759. The Court noted that the Guidelines leave no room for the jury at sen-
tencing. Id. ("[T]he words 'the court' mean 'the judge without the jury,' not 'the judge work-
ing together with the jury.'").
185. Id. at 760-62. This result would happen because the jury trial requirement elimi-
nates the use of presentence reports by judges. Id. at 760. Historically, judges could use
presentence reports to get a sense of the real conduct of a defendant in his commission of a
crime, such as infliction of bodily harm or possession of a firearm. Id. at 760-62. The ra-
tionale was that since a single crime could be perpetrated in a multitude of ways, the pre-
sentence report helps achieve uniformity of sentencing because judges would sentence
convicted defendants based on the crime and circumstances of its commission. Id. at 760.
Because the presentence report is given to the sentencing judge after trial and often in-
cludes information not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Stevens's rul-
ing would prohibit its use. See id.
186. Id. at 761. Justice Breyer suggested that imposing the jury trial requirement on
the current Guidelines would render them unworkable for courts, juries, prosecutors, de-
fense attorneys, and defendants alike. See id. at 761-62.
187. Id. at 763 ("[A]ny factor that a prosecutor chose not to charge at the plea negotia-
tion would be placed beyond the reach of the judge entirely. Prosecutors would thus exer-
cise a power the Sentencing Act vested in judges: the power to decide, based on relevant
information about the offense and the offender, which defendants merit heavier punish-
ment.").
188. Id. The Court found it unlikely that Congress envisioned a system allowing judges
to consider any fact in adjusting a sentence down, while limiting the facts permitting an
upward departure. Id.
189. Id. at 764.
190. See id.
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without invalidating either the Act or the Guidelines.'91 Justice
Breyer identified two provisions requiring removal (along with
any cross-references to them): 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)'92 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e). 193 The Court excised section 3553(b)(1) because
it contains the mandate that judges must apply sentences in ac-
cordance with the Guidelines. 94 Without this requirement, the
Sixth Amendment is satisfied, and the Sentencing Reform Act
and the Guidelines remain functional, albeit in an advisory
role.'95 Justice Breyer assured readers of his opinion that the Sen-
tencing Reform Act still requires judges to consider sentencing
ranges set in the Guidelines when sentencing convicted offenders,
as well as the goals and purposes of Congress in creating the Sen-
tencing Commission.196
The Court removed section 3742(e) because it contained exten-
sive references to section 3553(b)(1).'97 Although the excision of
section 3742(e) leaves the Sentencing Reform Act without a stan-
dard of review for appealed sentences, Justice Breyer found this
fact unimportant because "a statute that does not explicitly set
forth a standard of review may nonetheless do so implicitly."'9'
The Court found this implicit standard by looking to previous
versions of section 3742(e), which imposed an unreasonableness
standard of review.' 99 While acknowledging that advisory sen-
191. This type ofseverability analysis requires the Court to consider whether Congress
would intend for part of a statute to remain effective when a constitutional conflict re-
quires amendment of that law. Id. at 757. This examination requires that the Court "re-
tain those portions of the [Sentencing Reform] Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2)
capable of 'functioning independently,' . . . and (3) consistent with Congress' basic objec-
tives in enacting the statute." Id. at 764 (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Airlines v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
192. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2004) (stating that judges "shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range" provided for by the Guidelines).
193. Id. § 3742(e) (setting out standards of review on appeal of a sentence).
194. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 764-65 ("The Act nonetheless requires judges to consider the Guidelines
sentencing range established for.., the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant,' . . . the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy state-
ments, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide res-
titution to victims .... And the Act nonetheless requires judges to impose sentences that
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punish-
ment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training and medical care.") (citations omitted)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2000)).
197. Id. at 765.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 765. By reverting to the requirement of reasonable sentencing in previous
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tencing guidelines and an unreasonableness standard of review
for sentencing decisions are not the regime envisioned by Con-
gress, Justice Breyer believed that this application of the jury
trial requirement would "continue to move sentencing in Con-
gress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing
disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize
sentences where necessary."2"' Notably, Justice Breyer recognized
that Congress now has the task of reforming the Guidelines to
function in accordance with Booker.20 '
2. Justice Stevens's Dissent
a. The Guidelines Are Neither Facially Invalid nor Subject to
Severability Analysis
Justice Stevens began his analysis by citing the "fundamental
premise of judicial review that all Acts of Congress are presump-
tively valid."2 2 As such, the Court may invalidate a duly enacted
statute "'only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded
its constitutional bounds.' 2 3 Otherwise, the Court must rely
upon the two exceptions to this presumptive validity: (1) facial
invalidity, if the law is unconstitutional in all or almost all of its
functions, and (2) total invalidation of the law, if the unconstitu-
tional provisions cannot be severed from the rest of the statute.2 4
versions of section 3742(e), the Court has essentially invalidated part of the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670 (2003) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.S. § 3742(e) (Law. Co-op. 2004)), in addition to sections 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e). See
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765.
200. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 ("We can find no feature of the remaining system that
tends to hinder, rather than to further, these basic objectives. Under these circumstances,
why would Congress not have preferred excision of the 'mandatory' provision to a system
that engrafts today's constitutional requirement onto the unchanged pre-existing stat-
ute-a system that, in terms of Congress' basic objectives, is counterproductive?").
201. Id. at 768 ("Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress'
court. The National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the sentenc-
ing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal
system of justice.").
202. Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 607 (2000)).
204. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The dissent argued that the numerous constitutional applica-
tions of the Guidelines, even with the jury trial requirement, pre-
vented a finding of facial invalidity.25 Justice Stevens noted that
over ninety-five percent of all federal criminal cases end via plea
bargaining, and of the cases proceeding to trial, only half actually
resulted in the imposition of sentence enhancements.2 °6 In the few
remaining cases where federal judges applied sentence enhance-
ments, Justice Stevens provided three reasons why it is unlikely
that the Sixth Amendment will be implicated. First, the jury trial
requirement would not come into play if the accused waived his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.0 7 Second, judges would be
able to protect the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defen-
dants at sentencing with the current mandatory Guidelines.2 '
Third, Blakely prohibits judicial fact-finding only when it in-
creases the sentence of an accused beyond that which could have
been imposed solely from facts found by the jury or admitted by
the defendant.209 Thus, according to Justice Stevens, judicial fact-
finding is not "unconstitutional per se."210
Turning to the issue of severability, Justice Stevens simply
concluded that severability does not apply, because all of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act's provisions are constitutional and fell within
Congress's power to enact legislation.211 In light of this finding,
Justice Stevens criticized the Majority Opinion Part II Justices
for creating a new kind of severability analysis in its holding.212
Moreover, he claimed that the Court exceeded its authority by in-
validating constitutionally valid legislation-a right generally re-
served for Congress.213
205. See id. at 772-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 772-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2541 (2004)
("When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements
so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact
finding.").
208. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 779-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 787-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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b. The Guidelines Can Satisfy the Sixth Amendment Without
Becoming Advisory
Rather than make the Guidelines advisory, Justice Stevens
recommended that the sentencing system remain in place with
the requirement that "any fact ... required to increase a defen-
dant's sentence under the Guidelines [be proved] to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt."214 In support of his remedy, Justice Stevens
noted that the Department of Justice implemented procedures
post-Blakely that included alleging facts relevant to sentence en-
hancements.21 5 In citing these procedures, however, the dissent
assumed that the Department of Justice's approach to criminal
prosecutions in the wake of Blakely would be successful-an un-
founded claim at best.216
c. Congress Has Already Rejected an Advisory System of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines
Considering Congress's intent in providing for the establish-
ment of the Guidelines, Justice Stevens criticized the Majority
Opinion Part II Justices for adopting a system of sentencing that
Congress previously considered and rejected.2 7 The dissent noted
that a key influence on Congress's decision to create the Sentenc-
ing Commission was the sentencing disparities caused by judicial
discretion.2"8 As Congress worked through different proposals for
a commission on sentencing from 1977 to 1984, each successive
bill contained sentencing regimes that were less advisory and in-
cluded greater restrictions on judicial discretion.219 Justice Ste-
vens also disagreed with Justice Breyer's analysis of congres-
sional intent regarding the Sentencing Reform Act. Whereas
Justice Breyer found that Congress intended judges to play a role
in sentencing reform,22 ° Justice Stevens believed that a distrust of
judges provided the impetus for the creation of the Sentencing
214. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2552, 2554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing the limitations of a sentencing system requiring that the prosecution plead and
prove every fact relevant to sentence enhancement).
217. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Commission.22' Thus, Justice Stevens maintained that it was not
at all clear, despite Justice Breyer's assertion to the contrary, 222
that Congress would have preferred advisory Guidelines to a sen-
tencing scheme incorporating the jury trial requirement.2 23
3. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia wrote separately from Justice Stevens to discuss
the implications of the reasonableness standard of review for sen-
tencing established by Justice Breyer.224 First, Justice Scalia
noted the irony of the remedial majority's decision to "rescue from
nullification a statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretion-
ary sentencing [by] discard [ing] the provisions that eliminate dis-
cretionary sentencing."221 Justice Scalia opined that the practical
effect of advisory Guidelines was to allow federal judges full dis-
cretion at sentencing 226 -a prospect Congress sought to prevent
when it created the Sentencing Commission.227
Next, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Breyer for ignoring the
principle that "appellate review of sentencing discretion [is] lim-
ited to instances prescribed by statute. 228 Justice Scalia observed
that in the case of sentencing decisions under the Guidelines, sec-
tion 3742 only allows a court of appeals to review a sentence for
unreasonableness "when the sentencing court has departed from
'the applicable guideline range.' 229 Moreover, Justice Scalia found
221. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court pointed to the recent PROTECT Act
as indicative of Congress's continued fear of judicial discretion. Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
222. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
223. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 784-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 745 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a separate opinion dis-
agreeing with Justice Stevens's reliance on committee reports and individual statements
of members of Congress as indicative of congressional intent. Id. at 789 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia also rejected Justice Stevens's assertion that "even if the change to
an indeterminate system were necessary, the Court could have minimized the conse-
quences to the system by limiting the application of its holding to those defendants on di-
rect review who actually suffered a Sixth Amendment violation." Id. at 788 n.17 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
228. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 792 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2) (Law. Co-op
2004)). The four types of appeal allowed by section 3742 arise when the sentence was: (1)
"imposed in violation of law;" (2) "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
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that this standard only applied to seventeen percent of all federal
sentencing appeals in 2002.230 Thus, Justice Scalia believed that a
unitary standard of unreasonableness for all sentencing review
was inappropriate.231
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that Justice Breyer's reason-
ableness standard of review for sentencing decisions would create
conflicting holdings for similar cases among the federal appellate
courts.232 Justice Scalia claimed that because a reasonableness
standard of review requires individual evaluation of each sen-
tence rather than application of the Guidelines' standards, differ-
ent appellate judges would likely reach dissimilar conclusions
when faced with similar cases. 3 The result, according to Justice
Scalia, would be a "discordant symphony of different standards,
varying from court to court and judge to judge."234
4. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately to apply a severabil-
ity analysis, which Justice Stevens claimed was inapplicable, to
the Sentencing Reform Act.2 3' First, Justice Thomas reiterated
the requirement that the Court "invalidate a statute only if the
plaintiff establishes that the statute is invalid in all of its applica-
tions."236 Justice Thomas noted that numerous provisions of the
Guidelines and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), act-
ing in concert with section 3553(b)(1), resulted in an unconstitu-
tional sentence for defendant Booker. 23' Thus, Justice Thomas
opined that the Court should have considered the constitutional-
ity of all of these provisions.238 Citing numerous constitutional
sentencing guidelines;" (3) "either above or below the applicable guideline range;" or (4)
"plainly unreasonable" and no guideline is applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)-(b)(4),
(e)(1)-(4), (f)(1)-(2) (Law. Co-op. 2004).
230. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 794-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens failed to apply a severability
analysis to the Sentencing Reform Act because he claimed that "severability analysis sim-
ply does not apply." Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 796-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 797 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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applications of these provisions, even with the jury trial require-
ment, Justice Thomas reasoned that none were subject to facial
invalidation." 9
Turning to severability, Justice Thomas disagreed with Justice
Stevens's conclusion that severability analysis did not apply.24 °
The result of Justice Thomas's examination of the Sentencing Re-
form Act, however, differed from that of Justice Breyer.241 Justice
Thomas began his analysis from the same starting point that
Justice Breyer began his242-" [u]nless the Legislature clearly
would not have enacted the constitutional applications independ-
ently of the unconstitutional application, the Court leaves the
constitutional applications standing."243 Justice Thomas, however,
reached a different conclusion. Pointing to Congress's intent to
bind judges under a system of mandatory Guidelines and the
many constitutional applications of the Guidelines with a jury
trial requirement, Justice Thomas argued that "it is far from
clear that Congress would not have passed the [Sentencing Re-
form Act] or allowed Rule 32 to take effect, or that the Commis-
sion would not have promulgated the Guidelines at issue, had ei-
ther body known that the application of the scheme to Booker was
unconstitutional."2 Rather, Justice Thomas claimed that Justice
Stevens's remedy of imposing a jury trial requirement without al-
tering the Guidelines "does the least violence to the statutory and
regulatory scheme."245
V. THE IMPACT OF BOOKER: A COUNTRY WITHOUT THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES?
A. The Remnants of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
As noted earlier, Justice Stevens's response to the question of
whether the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right applies to the
239. Id. at 797-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 800 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Justice Breyer grossly distorts severabil-
ity analysis by using severability principles to determine which provisions the Court
should strike as unconstitutional.").
242. See id. at 758-59.
243. Id. at 801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 802 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Guidelines was hardly a surprise in light of the Court's decisions
in Apprendi and Blakely.246 However, the remedy fashioned by
Justice Breyer's majority opinion dropped a bomb on the federal
courts and Congress. Justice Breyer's ruling that the current
Guidelines are merely advisory represents a tremendous shift
from the current sentencing scheme. 247 The Court essentially re-
wrote portions of the Sentencing Reform Act and changed a con-
gressional mandate that judges sentence according to rules pre-
scribed by the Sentencing Commission.2 4' This result raises
several noteworthy issues. 249
1. Coming Full Circle: The Return of Indeterminate Sentencing?
The main academic question in the aftermath of Booker is
whether the Court may rule that the Guidelines are advisory. It
is worth noting that of all the Justices sitting on the Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer, more than anyone else, understands the
Guidelines and the forces that drove Congress to create the Sen-
tencing Commission-he helped create both °.2 " For this reason,
his conclusion that Congress would have preferred an advisory
sentencing system to a mandatory one incorporating the jury trial
requirement is surprising. By making the Guidelines advisory,
Justice Breyer dismissed Congress's goal to severely limit judicial
discretion.5 1
246. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
247. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 787-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
249. Note that the split majority happened when Justice Ginsburg inexplicably joined
Justice Breyer's majority opinion after joining in Justice Stevens's ruling that Blakely im-
plicated the Guidelines. Without any concurring or dissenting opinion, lawyers, judges,
and commentators are left to speculate on her rationale for doing so. See Linda Green-
house, Supreme Court Transforms Use of Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2005, at A4.
250. Justice Breyer was Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1979-
1980, a time when legislators were attempting to pass the Sentencing Reform Act. He also
served as a member of the Sentencing Commission from 1985-1989. See SUPREME COURT
OF THE U.S., THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, available at http://www.supre-
mecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); Greenhouse, supra
note 249, at A4. For an interesting discussion of the Guidelines by Justice Breyer, see gen-
erally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
251. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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While it is true, as Justice Breyer claimed,25 2 that reducing
unwarranted disparity in sentencing was a goal of Congress in
promulgating the Sentencing Reform Act, this was not the only
goal.253 The basic purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act was to
end indeterminate sentencing because it created unfounded dis-
parities in sentencing. 24 As such, Congress was most concerned
with eliminating the system of indeterminate sentencing that had
developed along with the rehabilitation ideal.255 Thus, the holding
in Majority Opinion Part II creating an advisory Guidelines sys-
tem is ironic, because it returns sentencing to its pre-Sentencing
Reform Act status. Now, although federal courts must consider
the Guidelines when sentencing criminal defendants, judges may
impose any sentence they deem reasonable.256 In contrast, Justice
Stevens suggests maintaining the Guidelines as they are and im-
posing the jury fact-finding requirement before judges can go be-
yond the standard sentencing range for a crime.257 The return to
indeterminate sentencing that Justice Breyer made possible will
likely produce the same problems that existed before the imple-
mentation of the Guidelines.258
Compounding the problems created by a return to indetermi-
nate sentencing, the Court also invalidated the standard of re-
view for sentencing decisions under the PROTECT Act of 200329
when it excised section 3742(e).26° In doing so, Justice Breyer
failed to make the same determination as he did in removing sec-
tion 3553(b)(1)-namely, whether Congress would intend to keep
252. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759-62.
253. See id. at 785-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The House version of the bill preferred the
Guidelines to be written by the Judicial Conference of the United States-the House Re-
port accompanying that bill argued that judges had vast experience in sentencing and
would best be able to craft a system capable of providing sentences based on real conduct
without excessive disparity .... Those in the Senate majority, however, favored an inde-
pendent commission. They did so, whether rightly or wrongly, based on a belief that fed-
eral judges could not be trusted to impose fair and uniform sentences .... And, at the end
of the debate, the few remaining Members in the minority recognized that the battle to
empower judges with more discretion had been lost."); see also supra notes 26-32 and ac-
companying text.
255. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. See id. at 766.
257. See id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This jury trial requirement has its own de-
ficiencies as explained infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 199.
260. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765.
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the de novo standard if the Guidelines were made advisory or im-
plement a standard of reasonableness.26' The Court disregarded
the fact that Congress explicitly changed the standard of review
from reasonableness to de novo review because it felt judges were
exercising too much discretion in implementing downward depar-
tures. 2 Justice Breyer merely stated that by making the Guide-
lines advisory, "the reasons for these revisions ... have ceased to
be relevant." 63 This could not be farther from the truth. Con-
gress's purpose in changing the standard of review for sentencing
decisions was to further reduce judicial discretion-or to put it
another way, Congress wanted to establish a stricter adherence to
the Guidelines. 4 Imposing a standard of review of mere reason-
ableness only adds to judicial discretion because appellate review
of sentencing decisions will depend on whether a judge suffi-
ciently justified his sentence rather than whether there were suf-
ficient factors to support that sentence.265
In sum, considering the intent of Congress in promulgating the
Sentencing Reform Act, it is not at all clear that Congress, as Jus-
tice Breyer claimed, "would likely have preferred the total invali-
dation of the Act to an Act with the [Court's Sixth Amendment]
requirement engrafted onto it, but would likely have preferred
the excision of the Act's mandatory language to the invalidation
of the entire Act." 266 If anything, the Court's remedy seems "an
exercise of legislative, rather than judicial, power. '267
2. The Impact of Booker on the Lower Federal Courts
Despite Justice Breyer's questionable reasoning in ruling that
the Guidelines are now advisory, the truth is that no appellate
261. See id. at 764-66.
262. See id. at 787 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 765.
264. See 149 CONG. REC. S5122-23 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[The game is over for judges: You will have some departure guidelines from the Sentenc-
ing Commission, but you are not going to go beyond those, and .you are not going to go on
doing what is happening in our society today on children's crimes, no matter how soft-
hearted you are. That is what we are trying to do here.... We say in this bill: We are sick
of this, judges. You are not going to do this anymore except within the guidelines set by
the Sentencing Commission.").
265. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 743.
267. Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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court may now review his decision.268 While it is possible that the
federal government may challenge the validity of Justice Breyer's
holding in a lower federal court as an unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power in violation of the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, it is more likely that Congress and the Sentencing Commis-
sion will analyze the implications of Booker and focus on amend-
ing the Guidelines in the future.269
In the meantime, it is worth considering the practical question
of what the federal courts will do. Lower federal courts will likely
apply the Guidelines in an advisory manner as instructed by
Booker.27° The reason is simple when one considers the history of
the Guidelines. When Congress created the Sentencing Commis-
sion, it did so because of a growing distrust of judicial discretion
in sentencing.271 This animosity was so severe that the Senate re-
fused to allow the Sentencing Commission to be filled entirely by
judges, despite their obvious qualifications. 2  As noted earlier,
federal judges reacted negatively to the Guidelines upon their en-
actment,273 and there is already anecdotal evidence that current
and former federal judges approve of an advisory system with
greater sentencing discretion. 4 It remains to be seen, however,
whether Congress will allow this new system of advisory Guide-
lines to continue.
268. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[I]t is this Court's prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents.").
269. See Press Release, Ricardo H. Hinojosa, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Chair, U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission Chair Comments on High Court Ruling, (Jan. 13, 2005) ("Now that a
decision has been issued, the Commission will work with Congress, members of the federal
judiciary's Committee on Criminal Law, the Department of Justice, the defense bar, mem-
bers of the criminal justice community, and other interested individuals to ensure that we
have a fair and just sentencing system within the bounds of our Constitution."), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel011305.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
270. Contrast this with the lower federal courts' response post-Blakely, where many
upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying
text.
271. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
272. See 130 CONG. REC. 976 (1984) (statement of Sen. Laxalt) ("The present problem
with disparity in sentencing ... stems precisely from the failure of Federal judges-
individually and collectively-to sentence similarly situated defendants in a consistent,
reasonable manner. There is little reason to believe that judges will now begin to do what
they have failed to do in the past.").
273. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
274. See Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over Controlling Punishments Is
Widely Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29.
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B. The Legislative Response
1. Sentencing Reform: Examining the Possibilities
a. Justice Breyer's Advisory Guidelines
The current Guidelines are merely advisory after Justice
Breyer's holding in Booker.27 Advisory Guidelines require that
federal judges consider but not necessarily follow the Guidelines
when making their sentencing decisions." 6 This option has re-
ceived some support, albeit only as a temporary solution.277 The
main advantages of this solution are that it complies with Booker
and is simple to apply.27 It should only be a temporary fix, how-
ever, with Congress legislating a new sentencing scheme after
completing a sufficient analysis of how best to implement deter-
minate sentencing without invoking Booker.279 Advisory Guide-
lines essentially reinstate indeterminate sentencing-a regime
Congress explicitly rejected when it enacted the Sentencing Re-
form Act.2"' Moreover, Congress still seems to believe it must
limit judicial discretion at sentencing. 281 Thus, Justice Breyer's
plan, although constitutional, is contrary to congressional intent.
b. Justice Stevens's Jury Trial Requirement
Justice Stevens proposed a plan where prosecutors must plead
and prove every fact necessary to support a conviction and sen-
tence.2" 2 Prosecutors did attempt to adopt this solution following
the Court's decision in Blakely." 3 Requiring prosecutors to plead
and prove every fact, however, shifts a tremendous burden onto
275. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767-68.
276. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
277. See Blakely Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Frank Bowman, Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testi
mony.cfm?id=1260&wit id=647 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); Blakely Hearings, supra note
129 (testimony of Ronald Weich, Partner, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1260&wit-id=3685 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
278. See Blakely Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Frank Bowman).
279. See id. (testimony of Ronald Weich).
280. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
283. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see supra note 128.
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both the government and the defendant. Prosecutors would need
to invest additional resources to ascertain all facts relevant to
sentencing--despite the fact that these facts are generally un-
available until after trial.284 Defendants would be subject to
prosecutorial rather than judicial discretion at sentencing, be-
cause prosecutors decide which charges and facts to present to
the jury.8 5 Justice Stevens's solution would also place defendants
in the difficult position of defending against aggravating facts
during trial rather than at sentencing. 286 For example, an accused
might have to argue simultaneously that he did not commit rob-
bery, but if he did, he did not use a gun. The result is a funda-
mentally unfair system that satisfies the Sixth Amendment while
possibly violating the defendant's right to due process.28 7
c. The Kansas Plan
In the wake of Apprendi, Kansas adopted a bifurcated trial
proceeding for criminal prosecutions where sentencing factors
needed to be pleaded and proven to a jury.2" This process seems
to be a sure way to integrate the Sixth Amendment requirements
of Booker into the Guidelines. There are, however, significant
challenges to doing so. The first is the increased cost of bifurcated
criminal proceedings for courts, defendants, lawyers, and ju-
rors.2"9 To a degree, this extra cost is alleviated by the fact that
the overwhelming majority of criminal cases end in guilty
pleas.29" This proposal, however, would substantially raise the
costs of preparing for trial-whether the case is resolved at the
284. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2555 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that "prosecutors [would have to] charge all relevant facts ... before many of the
facts relevant to punishment are known").
285. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
287. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718 (Cum. Supp. 2003); Blakely Hearings, supra note
129 (testimony of Frank Bowman). Bifurcated jury proceedings already take place in capi-
tal cases. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The formalities of capital
sentencing require a separate analysis and are not addressed in this Comment. For an in-
teresting discussion of Sixth Amendment rights at capital sentencing, see John G. Doug-
lass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing (2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the author).
289. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
290. Because less than ten percent of all criminal defendants go to trial, bifurcated pro-
ceedings would be meaningless or even detrimental for most criminal defendants. Id. at
2256-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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plea bargaining phase or proceeds to trial. This is so because in
preparing for trial, both prosecutors and defense counsel would
prepare simultaneously for sentencing.291 This burden may prove
especially difficult for defense counsel, whose resources are usu-
ally limited.292 In addition, prosecutors would wield great power
over criminal defendants by threatening more or fewer charges
during the plea bargaining process.293
d. Pure Charge System
Another solution to the issue presented by Booker would be the
implementation of a pure charge system. Under this scheme,
Congress would create a system of statutory crimes under which
every offender received the same sentence.294 In other words,
these sentencing guidelines would be perfectly determinate be-
cause every person convicted for the same crime would receive
the same sentence. 295 Admittedly, this regime produces uniform-
ity, but it would sacrifice many other goals of the Sentencing Re-
form Act.296 Most importantly, a pure charge system fails to con-
sider the particular circumstances of an offense, removing the
possibility of ensuring that the punishment fits the crime.297 This
result contradicts Congress's intent in establishing the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act.29
e. Raising Guideline Maximums to Statutory Maximums
Congress can also raise the upper limit of current sentencing
ranges for all crimes to the highest possible sentence under the
291. Cf. Roy Brasfield Herron, Defending Life in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, 51
TENN. L. REV. 681, 684 (1983) (noting that in bifurcated proceedings such as capital cases,
defense counsel must prepare for the trial and sentencing from the beginning of the case);
S. Adele Shank, The Death Penalty in Ohio: Fairness, Reliability, and Justice at Risk-A
Report on Reforms in Ohio's Use of the Death Penalty Since the 1997 Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation Recommendations Were Made, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 380 (2002).
292. See Shank, supra note 291, at 379-81.
293. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 2552-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
297. See id. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
298. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines-the statutory maximum. 299 After a jury convicts an
offender of a crime, the judge would have the discretion to apply
all facts in determining the defendant's sentence up to the statu-
tory maximum, subject to an abuse of discretion standard of re-
view.3"' In practice, this system would function just like the pre-
vious Guidelines, without changing the way judges apply them to
determine a sentence. 01 The key difference is that Booker is not
invoked, because a judge can never impose a sentence exceeding
the statutory maximum for a crime.0 2 One problem with this plan
is that it subjects sentences above the guideline minimum to
merely an abuse of discretion standard of review-Congress
would likely prefer that the Guidelines afford greater control of
judicial discretion.30 3
2. A Proposal for Congressional Action
It is clear from the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform
Act that Congress desired a mandatory guideline system as a
means of reducing judicial discretion and limiting sentencing dis-
parity. 4 Justice Breyer's remedy fails to satisfy that congres-
sional purpose."' Congress, however, can once again achieve that
goal in large measure and still comply with the Sixth Amend-
ment. As this section will explain, it is possible to retain most of
299. This proposal was introduced first by Professor Frank Bowman. See, e.g., Blakely
Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Frank Bowman) (advocating the Bowman Plan of
raising statutory maximums in response to Blakely); Frank Bowman, Memorandum Pre-
senting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with
Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 364 (2004) (proposing the Bowman Plan
in a memorandum to the Sentencing Commission addressing the implications of Blakely).
But see A Counsel of Caution: Hearing on the Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decision
for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of
Frank W. Bowman) (acknowledging that "topless guidelines" may be unconstitutional and
asking Congress to cautiously proceed in the wake of Booker), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Bowman021005.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
300. See Blakely Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Frank Bowman). Remember
that Apprendi and Blakely do not stand for the notion that judges may not exercise discre-
tion, they merely cannot find facts independent of a jury determination to increase the
sentence for a criminal defendant beyond the standard range for an offense. See Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2537; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
301. See Blakely Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Frank Bowman).
302. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(b)(3), 3581 (Law. Co-op. 2004).
303. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 33-41, 250-67 and accompanying text.
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the current Guidelines without making them wholly advisory and
without violating the constitutional principles mandated in
Booker.
Congress can maintain effective limits on sentencing disparity
and comply with the Sixth Amendment merely by making the
upper limit of each sentencing range advisory, while leaving each
lower limit as a mandatory guideline." 6 This amendment to the
Guidelines would retain the mandatory lower bound of sentenc-
ing ranges currently in effect. The authorized range for conviction
of a crime under the Guidelines with no additional judicial fact-
finding would vary between the current minimum and the statu-
tory maximum punishment allowed. The advisory maximum
would remain at the upper limit of the existing guideline, and
judges would be required to consider this boundary pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).3 07 To limit disparity at the upper end, Con-
gress should provide for an abuse of discretion standard of review
for sentences that depart upward from the Guidelines. 08 For sen-
tences within the ranges currently specified by the Guidelines,
Congress should retain the clearly erroneous standard of review
now in use.30 9 More importantly, Congress should continue re-
quiring appellate courts to review sentencing decisions that de-
part downward under a de novo standard of review. 10 Using this
approach, Congress can simultaneously satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment and control judicial discretion.
a. Mandatory Minimum Guidelines and Advisory Maximum
Guidelines Satisfy the Sixth Amendment
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
306. The author thanks Professor John G. Douglass for his insightful comments and
suggestions in developing the proposal set forth here. The author also acknowledges that
this proposal is very similar to and builds from Professor Frank Bowman's proposal for
"topless guidelines." See supra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
307. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (requiring that judges consider the Guidelines when
imposing sentences).
308. Because an upward departure from an advisory guideline would represent an ex-
ercise of discretion by the district court, the appropriate standard for review would be
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (noting that
the standard of review for "matters of discretion" is abuse of discretion).
309. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3742(e) (Law. Co-op. 2004).
310. See id.
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crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submit-
ted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."31' The
Blakely and Booker courts extended Apprendi to hold that the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."3" 2 By di-
recting the Sentencing Commission to make the upper limit of
Guidelines merely advisory, Congress would allow a judge-after
a jury verdict convicting the defendant and without further fact-
finding-to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum for
that offense. Congress thus avoids implicating the Apprendi line
of cases.
While this adjustment to the Guidelines may seem to circum-
vent the jury trial requirement because it allows judges broad
discretion in applying upward departures,313 the Court's jurispru-
dence clearly supports the exercise of judicial discretion to select
a sentence within the range justified by a jury verdict." 4 In
Booker, Justices Stevens and Breyer recognized the right of a
judge to select an appropriate sentence within the range allowed
by a jury's verdict.315 If Congress makes the Guidelines' upper
limit merely advisory, then a jury verdict would authorize the
judge to impose a sentence anywhere between the Guidelines
minimum and the statutory maximum. Although the Guidelines
would function as mandatory minimums with advisory maxi-
311. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (2000).
312. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746-47; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
313. See, e.g., Blakely Hearings, supra note 129 (testimony of Rachael Barkow) (noting
that the similar Bowman plan allows judges "to increase a defendant's sentence even
above the prior Guidelines ceiling"), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=1260&wit id= 3684 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
314. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 ("We have never doubted the authority of a judge to
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range."); Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 481 ("We should be clear that nothing.., suggests that it is impermissible for
judges to exercise discretion ... in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute"); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("But both before and since the
American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a pol-
icy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to
be imposed within limits fixed by law.").
315. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 ("We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exer-
cise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range."); id. at 804 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("[D]espite the absence of jury determinations ... [judicial sentencing] pro-
cedures [are] fair as long as the convicted offender has the opportunity to contest a
claimed fact before the judge, and as long as the sentence falls within the maximum of the
range that a congressional statute specifically sets forth.").
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mums, the Court has already upheld the constitutionality of
mandatory minimums in Harris.316
b. Mandatory Minimum Guidelines and Advisory Maximum
Guidelines Further Congress's Goal of Controlling Judicial
Discretion
This revision to the Guidelines would also advance Congress's
goal of limited judicial discretion at sentencing.317 Admittedly,
judges would have greater discretion if Congress made the upper
Guidelines merely advisory.31 Upward discretion, however, was
not Congress's main concern in enacting mandatory Guidelines.319
In passing the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress hoped to limit
instances of downward rather than upward departures. 32" As
noted earlier, Congress did not enact the Sentencing Reform Act
until there was a growing fear of the escalating national crime
rate.321 Thus, one of the goals of the Act was to ensure that crimi-
nal defendants received their just desserts. 22 Under a system
that retains the mandatory minimums from the previous version
of the Guidelines, Congress should not fear that disparate sen-
tences would return.
Furthermore, in practice, upward departures are seldom an is-
sue at the sentencing stage. Whereas thirty-five percent of all
criminal sentences usually include a downward departure,323 fed-
eral judges typically justify an upward departure in less than one
percent of all federal criminal cases.324 The requirement of de
novo review for departures below the mandatory minimum set by
the Guidelines simply retains the standard set forth in the cur-
rent statute as a means for controlling disparities brought about
through downward departures.325
316. Harris, 536 U.S. at 568-69.
317. See supra notes 33-41, 250-67 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
319. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000); see FIFrEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-13.
320. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 44, at 24 ("The inference that Congress thought that
past sentences were often unduly lenient, in the community's view, was inescapable.").
321. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
322. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000); see FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 33, at 11-13.
323. See 2002 STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at fig.G, 53-55 tbl.26.
324. Id.
325. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
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In sum, a Guidelines system with mandatory guidelines at the
lower end and advisory guidelines at the upper end would satisfy
the congressional purpose of controlling disparities in over
ninety-nine percent of cases, without violating the Sixth Amend-
ment. Congress would maintain control of judicial discretion
where it really matters (at the low end of the sentencing ranges)
and still comply with the Sixth Amendment jury requirement
where it applies (at the top of the sentencing ranges).
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's two-part holding in Booker has turned the Guide-
lines on their head. The main question now is how to fix the
Guidelines in a manner that does not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment but still advances Congress's goal of determinate sentenc-
ing. Justice Breyer's transformation of the Guidelines into an ad-
visory tool will prove to be the first step in what will surely be a
new period of sentencing reform. The answer to this question
should be the result of collaboration among members of Congress,
judges, prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, and other com-
mentators instead of the bitterness between Congress and the ju-
diciary that pervaded the enactment of the Sentencing Reform
Act. Among the myriad of options available to Congress, the best
choice would be to render the current Guidelines' maximums ad-
visory. This is the least costly way to preserve Congress's original
intent of creating mandatory Guidelines that limited judicial dis-
cretion and unwarranted disparities in sentencing. In the mean-
time, "[tihe ball now lies in Congress' court"326 as federal courts
and the nation anxiously wait to see what will ultimately happen
to the Guidelines.
Jonathan Chiu
326. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
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